Android shim attack surface

The Android operating system, characterized by its open-source nature and widespread adoption, faces significant security challenges due to its fragmented ecosystem. One such challenge is the attack surface presented by Android shims, intermediary software layers that facilitate compatibility between different versions of the OS and applications. This paper explores the vulnerabilities associated with these shims, highlighting how they can become potential gateways for security breaches.
Shims, while essential for maintaining application functionality across diverse Android versions, inadvertently introduce complexities in the system architecture. These complexities often lead to an expanded attack surface, where inconsistencies and loopholes in the shim layers can be exploited by malicious entities. The paper examines various scenarios where shims can be manipulated, including intercepting and altering system calls, modifying intent data, and unauthorized access to privileged system operations.
We conduct a thorough analysis of the shim architecture in Android, identifying key areas where vulnerabilities are most likely to occur. This includes a review of common practices in shim implementation, such as function hooking and intent interception, and their implications for system security. The paper also discusses real-world cases where shim vulnerabilities have been exploited, providing a practical perspective on the risks involved.
Furthermore, we propose a set of guidelines and best practices for developers and system architects to mitigate the risks associated with shims. This includes recommendations for secure coding practices, regular security audits, and the implementation of robust monitoring systems to detect and respond to potential security threats.