Schelling's Mystical Platonism 1792–1802

Naomi Fisher argues that Schelling is committed to two overarching theses, which together comprise his mystical Platonism. First, Schelling considers the absolute to be ineffable: It cannot be described in conceptual terms. For this reason, it remains inferentially external to any given philosophical system and is only intimated to us in certain analogical formulations, in works of art, or in nature as a whole. Second, Schelling is committed to a kind of priority monism: All things are grounded in the absolute, but finite things possess an integral unity all their own, and so have a distinct and relatively independent existence.
Highlighting these commitments resolves an interpretive dispute, according to which Schelling is a Fichtean idealist or a Spinozist, or he vacillates between these positions. Interpreting Schelling as advancing a mystical Platonism provides an alternative way of interpreting these early texts, such that they are by and large consistent. Fisher presents Schelling's early philosophy as a unique and compelling fusion of the old and new: Schelling fulfills the characteristic aims of post-Kantian philosophy in a way distinctive among his contemporaries, by drawing on and appropriating various strands of Platonism.
Read more